Abstract-Demand response is considered as a valuable functionality of the power grid and its potential impacts continue expanding with grid modernization. Colocation data centers (simply called colocation) are recognized as a notably promising resource for demand response due to their high power demand and remarkable potential in demand management. A major challenge of colocation demand response is the split incentive, that is, colocation operators desire demand response for financial compensation while tenants may not embrace demand response due to lack of incentives. To address this challenge, we study a hierarchical demand response scheme, where tenants within a colocation respond to the colocation operator while the operator interacts with the electric power company. We propose that twolevel marketing is suitable to this hierarchical scheme, and design a new market mechanism that results in a win-win situation for the operator and tenants. Specially, tenants who chooses to reduce power demand obtain financial rewards from the operator, while the operator receives financial compensation from the electric power company due to its tenants' demand reduction. An appealing feature of the mechanism is that it provably converges to a unique equilibrium solution. At the equilibrium, neither the operator or tenants can improve their individual economic performance by changing their own strategies. We evaluate the designed mechanism via detailed simulations and the results show the efficacy and validate the theoretical analysis for the mechanism.
Abstract-Demand response is considered as a valuable functionality of the power grid and its potential impacts continue expanding with grid modernization. Colocation data centers (simply called colocation) are recognized as a notably promising resource for demand response due to their high power demand and remarkable potential in demand management. A major challenge of colocation demand response is the split incentive, that is, colocation operators desire demand response for financial compensation while tenants may not embrace demand response due to lack of incentives. To address this challenge, we study a hierarchical demand response scheme, where tenants within a colocation respond to the colocation operator while the operator interacts with the electric power company. We propose that twolevel marketing is suitable to this hierarchical scheme, and design a new market mechanism that results in a win-win situation for the operator and tenants. Specially, tenants who chooses to reduce power demand obtain financial rewards from the operator, while the operator receives financial compensation from the electric power company due to its tenants' demand reduction. An appealing feature of the mechanism is that it provably converges to a unique equilibrium solution. At the equilibrium, neither the operator or tenants can improve their individual economic performance by changing their own strategies. We evaluate the designed mechanism via detailed simulations and the results show the efficacy and validate the theoretical analysis for the mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
Demand response programs offer financial compensation to motivate consumers to adapt their power demand according to power supply conditions. For example, consumers may reduce their power loads in response to direct requests or price-peak warning signals from electric power companies. A key vision of the future smart grid is transiting from the paradigm of supply-follow-demand to the one of demand-follow-supply. Demand response is identified as the crucial functionality to help realize this vision [1] .
This work studies a particularly promising resource for adopting demand response, which is colocation data centers (simply called colocation). First, colocation is a critical data center segment requiring tremendous energy consumption. For example, colocation (e.g., those of Equinix) in the US consumed more than 14.5 billion kWh in 2011, which was about 4.8 times of the energy usage by large-scale cloud data centers (e.g., those of Google) [2] . Second, colocation has significant potential to allow flexible power demand management. The potential roots from the fact that server utilization varies a lot overtime. Actually, the average utilization is very low, only around 10-15%, and idle servers can take up to 60% of the peak power [2] , [3] . There would be much power saving if adapting idle servers' operation status accordingly, for example, turning them off.
A key challenge to unleash the potential of colocation demand response is the split incentive, which is that colocation operators desire demand response while tenants hesitate about demand response. The operators' desire results from that they would receive financial compensation if participating demand response programs offered by electric power companies. The tenants' hesitation stems from that existing pricing mechanisms used by colocation provide no incentives and thus can hardly motivate tenants to actively adapt their power usage [3] , [4] .
It would be easy to address this challenge if colocation operators had control over tenants' servers. In this case, colocation operators could bypass tenants' hesitation and directly coordinate their servers' power consumption. However, the reality is that server power management by individual tenants is uncoordinated. A colocation (e.g., those of Equinix) rents out physical space to tenants for housing their servers. The colocation mainly provides facility support such as network, power and cooling, while individual tenants own and solely operate their servers. The colocation operator thus barely has control over tenants' servers and is unable to coordinate their power management. Note that by contrast, the operator of an owner-operated data center (e.g., those of Google) possesses such ability, because both servers and facilities in the data center belong to the single owner. This difference not only eliminates applying existing works that study owner-operated data center demand response, but also makes the split incentive challenge hard to solve.
A similar scenario is that multiple data centers in a network who together participate in the demand response program and try to organize their energy-saving rate through communication in a distributed way. The main difference between colocation and this scenario is that colocation has a unique operator, who has a financial conflict with tenants. But in this scenario, there is no operator to organize the data centers working together. Second, in colocation, all tenants use the same equipments, space and bandwidth and they share the power, cooling and physical facility. Thus they have the same working environment and they are charged by the same price structure. Therefore, the above differences make colocation distinct and also indicate that our work is different with the existing literature such as [5] - [10] .
To address the above challenge, we explore the feasibility and benefits of hierarchical demand response, where tenants interact with colocation operators while colocation operators respond to the electric power company. In particular, we propose a two-level market mechanism for colocation demand response. Tenants who reduce their power demand can obtain financial rewards from colocation operators. For example, this reward could be coupon or cash, which would reflect in next mouth bill. While colocation operators receive financial compensation from the electric power company due to tenants' demand reduction. The market mechanism has a hierarchical decision-making structure. The colocation operator leads the market by deciding the amount of demand reduction that best responds to the requests from the electric power company. Tenants choose to follow the operator's actions by independently submitting to the operator bids that best satisfy their own economic requirements.
To demonstrate the feasibility and benefits of such the proposed market mechanism, we analyze it using the framework of Stackelberg games [11] . Through rigorous game-theoretic analysis, we prove that 1) the market level among tenants converges to a unique Nash equilibrium where no tenant can improve its economic performance by changing only its own bid; 2) the whole market converges to a unique Stackelberg equilibrium where both the colocation operator and tenants achieve the best economic gain in presence of the Nash equilibrium. There is a win-win situation. We further evaluate the proposed market mechanism via detailed simulations. The results show that the efficacy of the mechanism and also validate the theoretical analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides system models. Section III proposes and analyzes the hierarchical demand response. Section IV presents simulation results. Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
This work considers a scenario that a set of N tenants house their servers in a colocation data center. We consider a one-period demand response [4] , [12] . A demand response signal from the electric power company is received by the colocation operator. If the operator takes part in the demand response game, he/she will receive a compensation from the electric power company for the energy reduction. In order to appeal the tenants to participate in reducing energy, the colocation operator provides a reward for each tenant who contributes to energy saving. According to tenants' intension of energy reduction, the operator decides how to response this demand response signal. All tenants consider whether they will take part in decreasing their energy according to their own conditions (e.g., workload or timing). There are many ways that tenants can use to reduce energy, for example, lowering the frequencies of server's CPU [13] , or transferring work loads to other data center [14] . The best and easy way to implement energy reduction is to turn off idle severs [4] .
The tenants who respond and save energy will get a financial benefit from the operator. This financial benefit is limited so tenants have to compete with one another to maximise their own benefits. Both the operator and the tenants make their strategies due to their own financial benefits. In the rest of this section, we present how to model these behaviors of the operator and tenants. Note that although these following modeling approaches seem restricted, it is widely used in the power market literature, e.g. [15] - [17] .
A. Colocation Model
We assume that there are N tenants in the colocation. We use q i to denote the quantity of electricity that tenant i ∈ [1, N] is willing to decrease. If tenant i decides not to respond to the operator, q i is set to 0. The total energy reduction by all the tenants is thus
Each tenant i incurs a cost C i (q i ), when he/she reduces an amount of q i energy. We assume that function C i (·) is continuous, increasing, strictly convex, and with C i (0) = 0. This cost includes switching cost, delay cost or management cost [4] , [18] . We uniformly model the total cost as convex function, because that can capture many common servers [18] , [19] . In practice, C i () is empirically measured by observing the system. According to principle of diminishing returns, as the unite amount of energy tenants save increase, the related cost will increase more and more fast [20] , [21] . In reality, when tenants turn off the server, the assigning jobs to each working server increase. At this time, if tenants try to turn off more server, the delay cost will increase more than the first time he/she turns off the server. The operator offers financial reward to tenants to incentive them to reduce energy. He/she chooses a reward price p to clear the market. This price p can stimulate the enthusiasm of tenants saving energy. It's quite easy to understand that the higher price can appeal more tenants to join in. We consider all tenants are price-taking customers in colocation. We assume that the relation between q i and p is
each tenant submits a bid to operator as the response for reward price. Here b i is the bid submitted by tenant i. b i reflects the saving capability of tenant i. The total energy reduction by all tenants is
We further use the following denotations to denote the sum bid (B i ) of all tenants and the sum bid (B −i ) except tenant i.
B. Utility of Tenants
The main concern of tenants is the utility for energy saving. This reward is based on the reward offered by operator and the cost incurred by energy reduction. We use W i to denote the reward provided by the operator and u i to denote the utility of tenant i.
W i is decided by the reward price and energy reduction from tenant i. If tenants want to participate into the reward competition, they need to decide their bids (b i ) and submit them to the operator.
C. Utility of Colocation Operator
The main concern of operator is potential of energy saving in colocation during the whole period. After collecting bids from all tenants, the colocation operator estimates the total amount of energy reduction and further estimates the utility for demand response. The utility is according to two key factors. One is the financial compensation from the electric power company due to responding to the demand response signal. The other one is the total cost for paying tenants who participate in the energy saving. Here we ignore the renewable energy and consider it in future work. We use K(·) to denote the financial compensation from the electric power company and C o (·) to denote the cost for the operator. Then the operator's utility is defined as
where function K(·) is a concave function.
III. THE HIERARCHICAL MARKET
From the above system model, colocation is divided into a two-level structure. The first level is the operator responses to the electricity company and also interacts with tenants. The second level is tenants decide and submit their bids. Both the operator and tenants seek financial benefits without any cooperation. Hence, this structure can be seen as a hierarchical noncooperative problem and can be analyzed as a Stackelberg game [11] . In this section, we mainly analyze the equilibrium status between both sides in colocation.
In a Stackelberg game, each player is rational and aims to maximize their own utility. There are two different types of players in such a game: leader(s) and followers. Leaders make the first move and decide their best strategy. Then the followers determine their best strategies accordingly. The best strategy means the strategy can maximize their own utility. Both leaders and followers determine their best strategies based on the other players' responses. The Stackelberg equilibrium is usually regarded as the solution to this game [11] .
In this work, the colocation operator is the only leader and those tenants who want to participate into the energy saving are the followers. The operator first decides a reward price and communicates it to the tenants. After receiving the price, those tenants calculate their energy reduction and decide their bids. Then they submit their bids to the colocation operator.
The operator collects the bids and then adjusts the reward price for the second time if the total rewards for tenants is beyond his/her budget. The tenants follow the operator's strategy and change their strategies. It is easy see that this is an iteration process. We prove that the iteration converges to an equilibrium. At the equilibrium, neither the operator nor the tenants can change their own strategies to improve their utility.
A. Nash Equilibrium among Tenants
Tenants compete for rewards offered by operator. We analyze the equilibrium among tenants. First, by manipulating Eqn. (1), (2), (3) and Eqn. (5), we have the utility of tenant i is
The derivative of Eqn. (7) is
Using Eqn. (4), Eqn. (8) is equivalent to
Because C i (·) is continuous, increasing, strictly convex and with C i (0) = 0, we have
From Eqn. (10) and Eqn. (11), we can see that
The reason is that in Eqn. (9) , the left part of the minus sign is no greater than one. There are two different cases for the right part of the minus sign. One is that it is no less than 1, and the other is that it is less than 1. For the first case,
∂ 2 bi is always less than zero. Thus utility u i is maximized when b i = 0 given B −i . For the second case, the second derivative of u i is
If
∂ 2 bi is less than zero. That means u i is concave and u i is maximized when ∂u ∂bi is equal to zero. That is
Thus the solution to Eqn. (13) maximizes utility u i . If
is less than 
where b * i denotes the best bid (or strategy) for tenant i, and B * −i denotes the sum best bids except tenant i. Accordingly, we have the following theories.
Lemma 1: If b * i is the best strategy at a Nash Equilibrium game, then b * Proof: To prove theorem 3, we first see the following convex optimization problem.
The first derivative of Eqn. (15) is
The second derivative of Eqn. (15) is
Thus we can see that F i (q i ) is strictly convex. When |N | > 2, the Nash equilibrium of the game among tenants solves the following convex optimization problem
is strictly convex, the optimization problem Eqn. (18)(19) is a strictly convex problem and thus has a unique solution. According to the optimality condition [22] , the unique solution q * i is determined by
Further, the unique solution of the convex optimization problem Eqn. (18)(19) must satisfy the following conditions:
With the Nash equilibrium in Eqn. (14), we have
Then, using Eqn. (2) and Eqn.(3), we furthermore have
Putting Eqn.(26) into Eqn. (24), we have the following deduction: 
We furthermore insert Eqn. (3) into Eqn. (29), and thus have the following inequality
Because p * is greater than zero and b i is arbitrary, Eqn. (31) is equivalent to Eqn. (24). Moreover, Eqn.(31) is equivalent to Eqn. (21) . Thus the Nash equilibrium satisfies the optimality conditions Eqn. (21) to (23) when |N | > 2, and solves the optimization problem Eqn. (18) (19) . Finally, this optimization problem has a unique optimum solution, hence the Nash equilibrium exists and it is unique. The theorem holds.
When tenants reach the unique Nsh equilibrium, no tenants can improve their utility by changing their own bids. If there are n tenants participating in the market and each one with q * i > 0, we can know that n ≥ 3 according to Lemma 1. Since F i (q i ) is convex, there exists at least one point (tenant k, k ∈ N ) that makes F k (q * k ) equal to zero. That is
We use G k (q k ) to denote the right part of above equation:
The first derivative of
Because q * j is less or equal than E N , we have
From the above inequality, we can see that when |N | is greater than 3, there is at least one Nash equilibrium, and p * is no greater than C k ( E 3 ).
B. The Stacklberg Equilibrium
This subsection analyzes the market level between the operator and tenants. When the tenants submit their a profile of bids (b), the operator tries to decide the best strategy by maximizing the utility function Eqn. (6) . We assume that
Here a is an adjustment coefficient. The cost of the operator is the reward offered to the tenants. This cost
Thus, the operator's utility is
Based on Eqn. (40), we have the following definition.
Definition 1 (Best Response for the Operator):
The best response of the operator is the best strategy for the operator with the tenants' bids b.
E(b) := arg max R(b).
(41)
Definition 2 (Stackelberg Equilibrium):
A stackelberg equilibrium is a strategy E * for the operator and a profile of strategies b * = (b * ) ∀i for tenants,
The first and second derivatives of Eqn. (40) are
We can see that the second derivative of Eqn. (40) is less than zero, and R(E) is a concave function. Hence, R(E) is maximized when R (E) = 0. We thus have
After tenants submit their bids, the operator can calculate the best amount of energy reduction by Eqn. (45) to maximize the utility. This best decision is dependent on tenant's bids and the financial compensation from the electric power company. Since the noncooperative game among tenants has a unique Nash Equilibrium, E * is also unique according to Eqn. (45). We have the following major theorem.
Theorem 4: The two-level market (or the Stackelberg game) between the operator and tenants has a unique Stackelberg equilibrium (E * , b * ). Stackelberg game brings a win-win situation for colocation. Both operator and tenants receive financial benefits in the game. It also proves that operator successfully split the incentive of demand response. In Stackelberg equilibrium, both operator and tenants can not move forward to maximize their benefits. So a reward price provided by operator is accepted by tenants and a profile of bids offered by tenants is received by operator. Then both sides calculate their financial benefits according to the reward price and bids.
C. Iterative biding
The above subsections present the Stackelberg equilibrium for on the two-level market. This subsection provides the iterative process between the operator and tenants and shows how to converge to the equilibrium. The iteration is as follows.
(1) Initialization: the operator first communicates the message of energy reduction and the initial value p(0). This value can be estimated from the historical data.
(2) k th −iteration: (i) Based on receiving the reward price p(k) from the operator, each tenant i will decide their bids by
Then the tenants submit these bids to the colocation operator.
(ii) After collecting all tenants' bids, the operator conducts updates accordingly. There are two steps. First, the operator calculates the best total amount of energy reduction by.
The second step is to decide the next round reward price based on the total amount of energy reduction.
The scalar r is called the modulus of p(·), which is a constant in [0, 1). In each iteration, both the operator and the tenants play their best response to the other's best strategies. One key question here is whether the iteration bidding will converge to a Stackelberg equilibrium. In the rest of this section, we prove that it surely converges to the equilibrium. To prove this is equivalent to show that the above iteration process is a contraction mapping [22] . The proof is as follows. We rewrite the above iterative process as
where T is a mapping from a subset Z(p(k) ∈ Z) of R into itself. Here, we assume that x is equal to p(k) and y is equal to p(k + n), (n ∈ N ), and y is equal to x + t, (t ∈ R). Thus,
Because E = a·Bi 2 , we have
We assume that when p(k +n) = y,
Next we calculate the difference between T (y) and T (x) by comparing Eqn. (51) and Eqn. (52).
If Eqn. (49) is a contraction mapping, it must have have the following property:
where · is a norm and α is a constant in [0, 1). We analyze the connection between the reward price (p) and the bid sum (B i ). When |N | > 2, the Nash equilibrium of the game among tenants solves the problem Eqn. (18) . Eqn. (18) is a convex optimization problem and has a unique solution. Thus,
We assume that F i (q i ) is equal to M . If M is equal to zero, the game reaches the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we can obtain the unique solution when M is equal to zero. But before reaching the equilibrium, M is a non-zero real value. By manipulating Eqn.(55), we can have
Based on Eqn. (2) and Eqn. (56), we have
Now we can see that b i deceases as to p, and B i deceases as to p. We return to prove the contraction mapping of the iteration process. Based on Eqn. (53) and Eqn. (54), we have
Because Eqn. (54) is greater than zero, we have
Because y > x, B i is greater than B i . We thus have
When r is small enough,
Hence, there must be an α that meets the following inequality.
And this proves that Eqn. (49) is a contraction mapping.
IV. EVALUATION
Till now we have studied the two-level market between operator and tenants, and presents theoretical guarantees for a Nash equilibrium among tenants and a Stackerberg equilibrium for the whole. In this section, we high light the benefits of our market design by using extensive simulations.
A. Simulation Setup
We consider a colocation having N tenants. In the evaluation, N is set to be three different values: 5, 10, and 15. And each tenant i has a number of servers uniformly from 3000 to 10000 [23] . We consider that the cost function of tenant i is C i (q i )= a i * q i + k i * q 2 i . Note that our simulations do not confine a specific form of functions. Any other functions that satisfy the properties in Section II are feasible. Due to the limited space, we only show the simulation results using the above quadratic function in this paper. In order to capture a large-scale tenants' cost sensitivity, here k i is a value that is randomly drawn from [1, 5] and a i is a value that is randomly drawn from [1, 6] . We set the total amount of energy reduction E as three different values: 50kWh, 100kWh and 150kWh due to the ability of energy reduction in different timing. The scalar r is set to 0.2. These parameters follow the realistic settings in colocations [23] .
B. Simulation Results
The three curves in Fig. 1(a) overlap with each other. This shows the sum of tenants' bids converge to a fixed value regardless of the value of energy reduction E. As the number of iterations increasing, the sum of bids first decreases fast. This is because both the operator and tenants do not know each other's condition at first and they adjust their strategies according other players' decisions in the following iterations. After the turning point, the sum of bids converges to a fixed point. This means each tenant can not change their strategies anymore in order to maximize their utility. And then the game reaches the Nash equilibrium. At the equilibrium the sum of bids is stable, the operator can calculate his/her utility. After 20 times of iterations, the sum of bids does not change that much. So this design is efficient and easy to realize. Fig. 1(b) illustrates that the reward price converges to a fixed value. As the iteration moves forward, the reward prices approaches to the equilibrium value. When the iteration reaches the unique Stackelberg equilibrium, the reward price does not change anymore. In Fig. 1(b) , three different curves overlap with each other, thus we have a conclusion that the reward price is independent of energy reduction E. Fig. 1(c) and Fig. 1(d) show the utility of tenants and the colocation operator, respectively. The tenant's utility first declines quickly and then slowly converges to a fixed value. A similar observation can also be made for the operator's utility. The reason is that the two-level structure is a noncooperative game, where players have no corporation and they decide their strategies individually. The tenants (followers) follow the strategy of the operator (leader). When they know the reward price from the operator before an iteration, they change their strategies accordingly in order to maximize their own utility. Further, the convergence demonstrates the tenants reach a unique Nash equilibrium and the whole reaches a unique Stackelberg equilibrium, which also validate our analysis in previous sections. Fig. 2 shows how the reward price at the Stackelberg equilibrium varies with the number of tenants. We can see the more tenants involve in the market, the more quickly the reward price declines. This result validates the analysis in Section III-A, such as Eqn. (37). Further, all curves approach to the equilibrium value after 30 iterations. This result partly demonstrates the fast convergence speed of the iterative biding in Section III-C.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We study a notably promising demand response resource, colocation data centers. We propose a new demand response scheme to address the split incentive between the colocation operator and tenants. The scheme has a hierarchical structure, where tenants interact with the colocation operator while the operator responds to the electric power company. The scheme is a market mechanism that results in a win-win situation for both the operator and tenants. The mechanism provably converges to a unique equilibrium solution, where neither the operator or tenants can improve their individual utility by changing their own strategies. Simulation results show the mechanism's efficacy and validate theoretical analysis. Both operator and tenants receive their financial benefits in equilibrium. Nowadays, many data centers have co-located renewable energy (such as wind and solar power) and thoughtful market mechanisms for demand response should consider it. The future work is to design mechanisms that are compatible with the time-varying renewable generation.
